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ABSTRACT: Civil-military relations has been a subject of Parameters’
articles for the life of the journal. Although interest in the topic
waxes and wanes, in recent years it has been the focus of concern
due to the appointment of two recently retired general officers to
the post of Secretary of Defense and the ahistorical proposed use
of the military by a president to address internal unrest. Undue
worry over this issue, however, detracts from other more pressing
problems facing civil society and our democracy today.

C

laims of civil-military crisis are a recurring feature of American
politics, and the current moment is no exception. Some
skepticism, however, is warranted regarding whether we now
truly face a uniquely urgent civil-military crisis. An examination of some
of the most frequently made arguments about the dire state of civilmilitary relations finds the evidence is equivocal. While there is indeed
reason for concern about several aspects of this relationship, we should
be wary of adopting purely formalistic conceptions of civil-military
relations, which can serve to distract us from other, more subtle threats
to American democracy.
The frequency with which claims of civil-military crises are made
should not be a surprise: the American Republic was born out of violent
military and political rebellion, and since the nation’s birth, civil-military
tensions have periodically erupted. Although what is understood as
constituting a civil-military crisis has varied over time, public and
scholarly hand-wringing has accompanied each instance.
In 1783 for example, Continental Army officers, angered by poor
pay and conditions after eight years of war, nearly mutinied against the
Continental Congress.1 In 1818, when General Andrew Jackson attacked
Spanish military posts in Florida in contravention of orders from his
civilian leadership, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun denounced his

1. Douglas V. Johnson II and Steven Metz, American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring
Problems (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 24, 1995), https://ssi.armywarcollege
.edu/american-civil-military-relations-new-issues-enduring-problems/; and Ugonna Eze, “George
Washington Calms Down the Newburgh Conspiracy,” National Constitution Center, Constitution
Daily (blog), March 16, 2018, https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/george-washington-calms-down
-the-newburgh-conspiracy.
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acts as insubordinate and unconstitutional.2 The American Civil War
was most assuredly a civil-military crisis, among other things. Scores of
US military officers took up arms against the elected civilian leadership
of the United States. President Abraham Lincoln struggled to control
even his own Union generals. Major General John C. Fremont, for
example, famously ignored clear direction from Lincoln and issued a
proclamation emancipating enslaved people in Missouri. Subsequently
Fremont actively sought to prevent Lincoln’s emissaries from delivering
the presidential message relieving him of command.3
Nearly a century later, angst about civil-military relations continued.
In 1951 General Douglas MacArthur’s public defiance of President
Harry Truman led Truman to relieve MacArthur of command. In the
1990s tensions over the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy regarding gay
and lesbian individuals serving in the military led active duty military
members to criticize President Bill Clinton publicly, which in turn
led many, like historian Richard Kohn, to warn of a “crisis in civilmilitary relations.”4
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, jeremiads about civil-military
relations continued, albeit with a striking shift in tenor. With patriotic
fervor and public esteem for the military running high, concerns over
tensions between military and civilian leaders were replaced by anxiety
about changing military demographics, civilian ignorance about military
issues, and what was widely conceptualized as the “civil-military gap.”5
More recently, the nature of the angst over civil-military relations
has shifted once again. During the administration of President Donald
Trump, persistent worries about the civil-military gap were joined by
growing concerns over the prominent role of retired senior officers in
partisan politics, the high number of current and former senior military
officials in the president’s inner circle, the sidelining of civilian expertise
within the Defense Department, and the use and potential use of the
military for essentially domestic missions including law enforcement

2. Herman von Holst, John C. Calhoun (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1888),
88–93; Roger Wendell Anderson, “Andrew Jackson’s Seminole Campaign of 1818: A Study in
Historiography,” (master’s thesis, Montana State University, 1956), 12, https://scholarworks.umt.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2580&context=etd; and Robert P. Wettemann Jr., Privilege vs.
Equality: Civil-Military Relations in the Jacksonian Era, 1815–1845 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security
International, 2009), 25–27.
3. Ronald E. Franklin, “How Abraham Lincoln Fired General John C. Fremont,” Owlcation,
June 17, 2018, https://owlcation.com/humanities/How-Abraham-Lincoln-Fired-General-John-C
-Fremont; and Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 50.
4. Richard Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” National Interest,
March 1, 1994, https://nationalinterest.org/article/out-of-control-the-crisis-in-civil-militaryrelations-343.
5. Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., “Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap: A Research
Note,” Armed Forces & Society 38, no. 4 (Fall 2012); and James Fallows, “The Tragedy of the
American Military,” Atlantic 315 (January/February 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine
/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/.
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and election security.6 In recent years, a growing chorus of voices have
suggested (or warned) that military personnel might find, at times, that
honoring their constitutional responsibilities requires disobeying—or at
least politely ignoring—their commander in chief.7 This essay examines
and evaluates some of the most common claims of civil-military crises.

Evidence of a Crisis
Claim 1: The US military is poorly understood by most American civilians.
This claim is surely true. Studies reveal Americans know little about
the military to which, since the 9/11 attacks, they have so eagerly offered
rhetorical support.8 But while the American public’s wholesale ignorance
of the US military may tell us something about America, it highlights
little that is unique to civil-military relations. After all, the list of things
most Americans do not know is distressingly all-encompassing: threequarters of Americans are unable to name all three branches of the federal
government; 37 percent cannot name any of the rights protected by the
First Amendment; most cannot correctly estimate the population of the
United States, and, as of 2014, a whopping 26 percent of Americans
thought the sun revolved around the earth.9
This general lack of knowledge suggests a crisis in American
education and civics in particular. It does not, however, suggest ignorance
about the military is an isolated variable, categorically different from, or
more important than, other gaps in basic civic knowledge. By itself, the
lack of familiarity is no barometer for measuring or predicting good or
bad decisions or healthy relationships among elite decisionmakers on
either the military or the civilian side.
6. Phillip Carter, “The Military Is Not a Political Prop,” Center for a New American Security,
February 12, 2018, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/the-military-is-not-a-political
-prop; Wright Smith, “The President’s Generals,” Harvard Political Review 44, no. 1 (Spring 2017),
https://issuu.com/harvardpoliticalreview/docs/hpr_spring_2017_proofed_2; Loren DeJonge
Schulman, Alice Hunt Friend, and Mara E. Karlin, “Two Cheers for Esper’s Plan to Reassert
Civilian Control of the Pentagon,” Defense One, September 9, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com
/ideas/2019/09/two-cheers-espers-plan-reassert-civilian-control-pentagon/159716/; and Thomas
Gibbons-Neff et al., “Former Commanders Fault Trump’s Use of Troops against Protesters,” New
York Times, June 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/us/politics/military-national
-guard-trump-protests.html.
7. Anthony Colangelo, “Would the Military Really Have to Obey a Trump Command to
Fire a Nuclear Weapon?” Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/opinion
/op-ed/la-oe-colangelo-duty-nuclear-20170804-story.html; and John Nagl and Paul Yingling,
“ ‘. . . All Enemies, Foreign and Domestic’: An Open Letter to Gen. Milley,” Defense One,
August 11, 2020, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/08/all-enemies-foreign-and-domestic
-open-letter-gen-milley/167625/.
8. Kori N. Schake and Jim Mattis, eds., Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military
(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016).
9. “Americans Are Poorly Informed about Basic Constitutional Provisions,” Annenberg
Public Policy Center (blog), September 12, 2017, https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter
.org/americans-are-poorly-informed-about-basic-constitutional-provisions/;
Harry
Alsop,
“Americans Surveyed: Misunderstood, Misrepresented or Ignorant?,” Telegraph, February 15,
2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10640690/Americans
-surveyed-misunderstood-misrepresented-or-ignorant.html; and Brian Resnick and National
Journal, “26 Percent of Americans Say the Sun Revolves around the Earth,” Atlantic,
February 16, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/26-percent-of
-americans-say-the-sun-revolves-around-the-earth/453834/.
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Claim 2: Less than 1 percent of the American public serves in the military, and
few members of the public have direct contact with military personnel.
This claim is at once true and, in itself, neither here nor there. The
percentage of the US population serving in the military on active duty
is unquestionably far smaller today than during the First and Second
World Wars or the Vietnam era. As a result, far fewer Americans
today have close ties to the military.10 But US wars involving mass
conscription have been historical anomalies. For most of American
history, the US military has been small and relatively isolated from
the broader population. In 1806 the size of the US Army and Navy
combined numbered fewer than 5,000 men, well under 1 percent of the
US population.11
The size of the military ebbed and flowed over the decades as wars
were fought and then ended. In the early 1930s, for instance, after the
demobilization that occurred following the First World War, the size
of the Army and Navy combined hovered around 235,000 out of a
population that exceeded 120 million.12 These small numbers were not
viewed as a civil-military problem but simply as the postwar reversion
to the norm of a small army—something perceived as a civic good for
most of American history.
The small percentage of the US population currently serving in
the military is often cited to explain the public’s ignorance of military
matters. Perhaps, but it is entirely possible a broad survey of, say, Army
personnel about Navy size, budgets, structure, or deployments, might
yield answers nearly as inaccurate as those of the general public. The
scale and complexity of the US military challenges even senior military
officials and scholars who devote their lives to its study.

Claim 3: Those who serve in the military are different from those who do not.
Undoubtedly the all-volunteer military is less geographically diverse
than it was during periods of mass conscription. Today’s armed forces
are more Southern and less urban, and those with a parent or sibling
in the military are far more likely to serve than those without family
links to military service.13 The US military also remains far more male

10. “The Military-Civilian Gap: Fewer Family Connections,” Pew Research Center, Social
& Demographic Trends, November 23, 2011, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/23
/the-military-civilian-gap-fewer-family-connections/.
11. “US Navy Personnel Strength, 1775 To Present,” Naval History and Heritage Command,
August 2, 2016, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list
-alphabetically/u/usn-personnel-strength.html; and Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry,
History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945, Department of the Army
Pamphlet 20-212 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 30, 1955),
https://history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-10/CMH_Pub_104-10.pdf.
12. “Between World Wars,” chap. 19 in American Military History, Army Historical Series
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, last modified April 27, 2001),
https://history.army.mil/books/AMH/amh-19.htm.
13. Dave Phillipps and Tim Arango, “Who Signs up to Fight?” New York Times, January 10,
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/us/military-enlistment.html.
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than the overall population (women make up just 16 percent of enlisted
personnel and 18 percent of officers).14
In many other ways, however, the military differs from the civilian
population in that it is more diverse: racial minorities make up 33
percent of the enlisted workforce, compared to a civilian population
benchmark of 23.7 percent, perhaps reflecting the military’s enduring
and largely justified reputation as an institution that allows for meritbased advancement.15 (Numerous studies suggest that despite significant
ongoing concerns about equality, women and minorities within the
military generally view it as a more equitable environment than the
civilian world.)16
In recent decades several studies of military partisan affiliation
have suggested that the military, especially the officer corps, skews
Republican, but evidence for this finding is mixed. An August 2020
Military Times poll found 41 percent of those surveyed said they planned
to vote for Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden in the 2020
election, while only 36 percent said they planned to vote for Republican
President Donald Trump.17
The more important question, however, is not whether those
who serve in the military are different from those who do not, but
whether those differences make a difference. Many professions differ
in discernable ways from a random cross section of the population.
Lawyers, clergy, doctors, engineers, and bankers all differ from the
overall population in patterned ways, but we rarely label this a problem
much less a crisis. If demographic or partisan affiliation differences
between military personnel and civilians lead reliably to problematic
differences in policy or performance, we might have reason to be
concerned. But thus far, although military personnel in the aggregate
differ from the civilian population in the aggregate, no clear evidence
indicates these differences translate consistently into differences in
policy or performance at the national level.
Certainly there are independent reasons to seek a military that
better reflects the demographics of the United States. Considerations of
fairness argue in favor of a more gender-balanced military and a military
in which both women and minorities are better represented at the
highest ranks and in all branches and military occupational specialties.
Research from other occupations also suggests increasing diversity
(in particular, increasing gender diversity) correlates with improved
14. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD-PR),
Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2017 Summary Report (Washington, DC:
OUSD-PR, 2017), 6, https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/MPP/AP
/poprep/2017/Executive%20Summary.pdf.
15. OUSD-PR, Population in the Military Services, 26.
16. Sarah Kliff, “The Most Satisfied Military Employees? Black Women. Least Satisfied?
White Men,” Washington Post, January 23, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
/wp/2013/01/23/the-most-satisfied-military-employees-black-women-least-satisfied-white-men/.
17. Leo Shane III, “Trump’s Popularity Slips in Latest Military Times Poll,” Military Times,
August 31, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/08/31/as
-trumps-popularity-slips-in-latest-military-times-poll-more-troops-say-theyll-vote-for-biden/.
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organizational performance, making it reasonable to worry that during
periods in which the military draws from relatively narrower slices of
the population, groupthink may increase and military innovation and
creativity may decrease.18
But without more clarity on which differences make a difference—
and the kind of difference these differences make—it is hard to argue
that demographic divergences between the military and the overall
population should primarily be construed through the lens of civilmilitary relations or seen as a sign of crisis.

Claim 4: Too many current or retired military personnel were given executive
branch leadership positions under Trump.
This claim is difficult to evaluate. Trump’s appointment of several
recently retired generals to his first cabinet triggered concerns his
administration was tilting too far in a military direction. But President
Barack Obama similarly appointed recently retired generals to senior
positions. And President Biden selected retired Army General Lloyd
Austin as his first Secretary of Defense.
How many generals is too many, and why? Some argue that a cabinet
stocked with senior military personnel might bias an administration
toward military rather than political, economic, or diplomatic solutions
to problems, but no clear evidence indicates that senior advisers with
military backgrounds provide advice to presidents in a manner that
differs in predictable ways from the advice of civilian senior advisers.
During the Trump administration, for instance, Secretary of Defense
James Mattis was viewed by many as a counterweight to the often more
hawkish and bellicose views of several of Trump’s civilian advisers,
despite Mattis’s status as a recently retired Marine Corps general.
A different critique suggests that if senior military officials begin to
view political appointments as a natural next step after leaving the military,
they may tailor their actions and comments as active duty officers to
fit the perceived political preferences of their favored political actors.
This hypothesis seems plausible, but it remains untested. Also unknown
is the degree to which senior military officials might already tailor their
decision making in order to garner congressional funding or position
themselves for postretirement positions with defense contractors or on
high-profile boards.
Some unique issues relate to having recently retired generals serve
as Secretary of Defense.19 In 1947 Congress prohibited retired military
personnel from heading the Defense Department without a seven-year
cooling-off period. The cooling-off period was designed to address two
18. David Rock and Heidi Grant, “Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter,” Harvard Business Review,
November 4, 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter.
19. Rosa Brooks, “Perspective: The Pentagon Needs More Civilian Control over the
Military Now, Not Less,” Washington Post, December 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/outlook/2020/12/09/lloyd-austin-civil-military-control/; and Jim Golby, “Sorry, Gen. Lloyd
Austin. A Recently Retired General Should Not Be Secretary of Defense.,” New York Times, December
7, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/07/opinion/biden-defense-secretary-dod.html.
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concrete concerns: first, that recently retired military personnel might
be overly loyal to their own service branch, and second, that they would
not yet be sufficiently acculturated to the needs and concerns of civilian
policymakers, rendering them less effective as the primary liaison
between civilian leaders and military officials.
We do not have many data points to evaluate the validity of these
concerns because presidents have nominated recently retired officers—
and requested Congress waive the cooling-off period—on only three
occasions (George C. Marshall in 1950, Mattis in 2017, Austin in
2021). That said, it is troubling that two presidents in a row have asked
Congress to pass legislation exempting specific individuals from a clear
statutory ban. Arguably, however, this trend is concerning more as a
matter of respect for the law than as a civil-military relations matter; a
law respected neither by presidents nor by Congress itself is not much
of a law.

Claim 5: Too many active duty and retired military personnel take partisan
positions in political campaigns and become involved in controversial
domestic political issues.
This concern predates the Trump administration, and here too,
both sides make compelling arguments. Given the high level of public
confidence in the military, it is no surprise political candidates from both
parties have sought to surround themselves with military figures with
stars on their shoulders and relatively broad name recognition. Moreover,
the trend toward seeking military endorsements has accelerated in recent
election cycles.
In June 2020 General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, was much criticized for accompanying then President Trump to a
staged photo opportunity in Lafayette Square after peaceful protesters
were dispersed with tear gas. Milley subsequently described his actions
as a mistake, acknowledging his “presence . . . created a perception of the
military involved in domestic politics.”20 While Milley’s actions triggered
a good deal of dismay about partisanship on the part of military officials,
this did not stop either 2020 major party candidate from reaching out
to retired senior military personnel to speak at campaign events and
offer endorsements.
Trump also contravened long-standing norms against using military
personnel domestically in a politicized manner. While numerous statutory
authorities allow presidents both to federalize National Guard troops
and deploy active duty troops domestically, the assumption has been
presidents will not use such authorities in narrowly partisan ways or to

20. Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Milley, America’s Top General,
Walks into a Political Battle,” New York Times, June 5, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05
/us/politics/protests-milley-trump.html; and Helene Cooper, “Milley Apologizes for Role in
Photo Op: ‘I Should Not Have Been There’ ” New York Times, June 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/06/11/us/politics/trump-milley-military-protests-lafayette-square.html.
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control or suppress Constitutionally protected activities.21 But during
the racial justice protests that followed the killing of George Floyd by
Minneapolis police, the Trump administration was widely condemned
for its overly militarized response, which included the threatened
invocation of the Insurrection Act to enable the deployment of active
duty troops in US cities.22 In the period before and after the 2020
election, President Trump also suggested the military might be used to
“safeguard” or monitor voting and vote counting.23
But do any of these actions bespeak a civil-military crisis or excessive
influence of the military in domestic affairs? Once again it is important
to tease out the different issues at stake. Some argue the growing role
of military endorsements in partisan politics may, like the appointment
of recently retired generals to senior political positions, ultimately
jeopardize the military’s reputation for impartial service or erode public
confidence in the military.24 These are legitimate concerns, but they rest
on the assumption that a high level of public confidence in the military
is an independent good and that it is possible to draw a clear, reliable,
and meaningful distinction between advice that is military in nature
and advice that is merely political.25
Arguably, public confidence in the military is not a good thing
in and of itself. Such confidence is a good thing only if the military
serves the public well. But has the high level of public confidence in
the military since 9/11 been justified by accurate public perceptions of
military professionalism, impartiality, and success? Or is high public
support for the military instead indicative of public anxiety, guilt, or
misinformation? If it is the latter, then an erosion of public confidence
in the military might be a healthy recalibration.
Further, can we say with certainty that we know the difference
between advice that is strictly military in nature and advice tainted by
politics? If war is “politics by other means,” it is politics nonetheless. To
assume military professionals inhabit some pure, politically neutral realm
is to imagine war as something it has never been and never can be. This
is not to say that norms of military professionalism do not matter. Most
Americans believe a clear and critical difference exists between good
21. Mark Nevitt, “The President and the Domestic Deployment of the Military: Answers
to Five Key Questions,” Just Security, June 2, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/70482
/the-president-the-military-and-minneapolis-what-you-need-to-know/.
22. Rosa Brooks, “Perspective: Trump Wants to Crush Black Lives Matter with a Law
That Fought Segregation,” Washington Post, June 2, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/outlook/2020/06/02/trump-military-insurrection-act/.
23. Deana El-Mallawany, Christina Kwon, and Rachel Homer, “Trump Can’t Lawfully
Use Armed Forces to Sway the Election: Understanding the Legal Boundaries,” Just Security,
September 23, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/72500/trump-cant-lawfully-use-armed-forces
-to-sway-the-election-understanding-the-legal-boundaries/.
24. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “How to Get Generals out of Politics,” War on
the Rocks, September 27, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/how-to-get-generals
-out-of-politics/; and Michael A. Robinson, “Danger Close: Military Politicization and Elite
Credibility,” War on the Rocks, August 21, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/danger-close
-military-politicization-and-elite-credibility/.
25. James Golby and Mara Karlin, “Why ‘Best Military Advice’ is Bad for the Military—and
Worse for Civilians,” Orbis 62, no. 1 (2018): 139.
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faith disagreements about ends and means and politically motivated lies.
In practice, however, the difference is often more difficult to discern.
Concerns about the danger of military politicization resonate with all
of us—but here too, claims of a civil-military crisis may overstate or
mischaracterize the case.
Similarly a president’s actual or threatened domestic use of the
military to further partisan ends poses urgent issues related to civil
liberties, the rule of law, and the misuse of executive power. It is less
apparent, however, that it makes sense to view these actions through the
lens of civil-military relations. In the case of the racial justice protests
in the summer of 2020, military leaders were quick to reaffirm the
nonpartisan US military is loyal to the Constitution rather than to a
particular president.26
Following the January 6, 2021, breach of the Capitol Building
by armed rioters openly supportive of Trump, Speaker of the House
Nancy Pelosi reportedly took the unprecedented step of asking the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs to ensure safeguards would be in place to
prevent the outgoing president from using his nuclear launch authority
in his last days in office.27 Needless to say, this too presents issues
of civilian control. I and others have argued there might be certain
extreme exigencies in which military disobedience to the commander
in chief’s orders would be the lesser of two evils, even if those orders
were not facially unlawful.28 If, for example, a president embroiled in
circumstances such as those of early January 2021 ordered a unilateral,
offensive nuclear strike against a target the military did not view as an
imminent threat, should ethical officers go along with those orders? Or
should they instead refuse to carry them out, perhaps asserting in such a
context, the order would violate core law-of-war principles?
Even in this case, it is not clear such ethical and legal dilemmas are
evidence of a civil-military crisis. For the United States to have reached
a point at which such exigencies are other than purely theoretical, other
crises must already have erupted.

Obscured by Overstatement

Thus far I have argued that many recent claims of a crisis in
civil-military relations prove, when closely examined, to be somewhat
overstated or to mischaracterize the issues. While there are genuine
reasons for consternation with regard to some matters, the evidence
of crisis is either lacking or ambiguous in others. When it comes to
civil-military relations, perhaps things are not as bad as they seem. Or,
26. Paul Sonne, “Joint Chiefs call Riot a ‘Direct assault’ on the Constitutional Process,
Affirm Biden as Next Commander in Chief,” Washington Post, January 12, 2021, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/national-security/military-statement-biden-commander-in-chief/2021
/01/12/9b722200-551a-11eb-89bc-7f51ceb6bd57_story.html.
27. David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pelosi Pressed Pentagon on Safeguards to Prevent
Trump from Ordering Military Action,” New York Times, January 8, 2021, https://www.nytimes
.com/2021/01/08/us/politics/trump-pelosi-nuclear-military.html.
28. John Ford, “When Can a Soldier Disobey an Order?,” War on the Rocks, July 24, 2017,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/when-can-a-soldier-disobey-an-order/.
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at any rate, often the things that are bad have less to do with civilmilitary relations than with other challenges—from widespread civic
disengagement to abuses of executive power.
More than anything, our ongoing preoccupation with civil-military
crises may reflect our increasing uncertainty about the overall purpose
of the military and our growing inability to define the role of the armed
forces—or the distinction between the political and military realms—in
any coherent way. Considering today’s complex, hybrid challenges such
as terrorism, epidemic disease, climate change, cyber threats, Russian
information warfare, and expanding Chinese global influence, it is
impossible to draw neat distinctions between the role of the military
and the role of diplomacy, development, and trade policy—or for that
matter, between foreign and domestic issues and threats.29 But with the
lines between war and not war, foreign and domestic, and military and
civilian growing ever blurrier, it is less clear what we mean when we talk
about crises in civil-military affairs.
Of course, the categories we rely upon to structure and give meaning
to our world—war, peace, foreign, domestic, military, civilian, and so
on—are categories we have created. These categories are neither sacred
nor stable, and if they no longer serve a useful analytic purpose—if they
are beginning to obscure more than they clarify—then we must develop
new ways of thinking about power, force, control, and the institutions
and rules we need.
This is an urgent challenge. Indeed, it could be our continued
fondness for civil-military jeremiads risks diverting attention away
from different but just as insidious threats to American democracy—
threats that may have more to do with other forms of state capture and
democratic dysfunction than with a crisis in civil-military relations or
civilian control of the military.
The Founders cared deeply about civil-military relations and civilian
control of the military. But they cared about this relationship for quite
pragmatic reasons—in the late eighteenth century, those who controlled
organized militaries had a unique ability to control the state and its
resources. The founders of the fledgling American republic crafted a
representative democracy in which, they hoped, the will of the people
would always prevail and not be hijacked by force of arms.
The commitment of the framers of the Constitution to civilian
control of the military stemmed from their deep mistrust of concentrated
power. The US Constitution represents a comprehensive effort to break
up concentrations of power, to ensure no one branch of government
can outmuscle the others, and to ensure no one individual, region, party,
faction, or group can permanently capture the state. In 1789 organized
militaries were the sole actors with the ability to cause mass destruction
of life and property; they consequently possessed a unique ability to
capture, coerce, and control other would-be political actors. A general
29. Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the
Pentagon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016).
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commitment to diluting concentrations of power, then, translated into a
specific commitment to ensuring that the military, in particular, would
be subject to multiple checks and balances.
Moreover these Constitutional checks and balances relating to
the use of military force took many different forms. The Constitution
established a system in which the military was subordinated to the
elected representatives of the people, and for good measure they also
divided control over the use of military force between Congress and the
president. The framers’ normative goal was to prevent concentrations of
power that could displace or distort the will of the people, and civilian
control of the military was valued because (and only because) it was one
of several overlapping mechanisms to ensure that the will of the people
would prevail over the will of the powerful.
Today, these core normative goals are as relevant as they were in
1789, for to believe in democracy is to believe that the political legitimacy
of a government derives from the free and informed consent of the
governed. Most of us believe that the choices of the American people—
constrained by our constitutional commitment to individual rights and
due process, but otherwise uncoerced and unmanipulated—should
guide our foreign and domestic policies.
But a formalistic commitment to civilian control of the military no
longer achieves what it promised to achieve more than two centuries
ago. For one thing, the US military today is nothing like the redcoats of
King George III, and nothing like the ragtag militias hastily assembled
under General George Washington. Instead, the US military now has
elaborate internal checks and balances and a deeply ingrained respect for
democracy and the rule of law.30 Most critically, the ability to destroy—
and hence to coerce and control—is no longer in the exclusive possession
of those with military forces and weapons.
Unlike in 1789, nonstate actors—even lone individuals—can now
cause death and destruction on a mass scale, and increasingly both states
and nonstate actors also have a range of nonkinetic means of coercion
at their disposal, from cyberattacks and bioengineered viruses to the
deliberate global spread of disinformation and fake news. All over the
world coercive power has become simultaneously more diffuse and
more concentrated. Individual billionaires, multinational corporations,
hackers, and nonstate terrorist groups can increasingly compete with
state militaries in their ability to control the behavior of both ordinary
people and political actors.31
At the same time, as noted earlier, the lines between military and civilian
tasks have grown increasingly indistinct. In today’s murky world of grayzone conflicts and persistent shaping operations, uniformed military
personnel train judges, eavesdrop on electronic communications,
30. Laura A. Dickinson, “Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of
International Law Compliance,” American Journal of International Law 104, no. 1 (2010): 1–28,
https://doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.104.1.0001.
31. Brooks, Everything Became War.
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vaccinate cows, and develop microfinance programs—and civilian
Intelligence Community employees and contractors conduct raids, plan
drone strikes, and execute offensive cyber operations. Both military and
civilian actors engage in information and influence operations.
In this blurry world, we need to ask ourselves a serious question:
what work, if any, is the concept of civilian control of the military
doing today? When we say it was dangerous for Trump to offer too
many senior administration positions to retired generals, or discourage
President Biden from doing the same, what exactly do we mean? What
specific negative consequences do we imagine would be more likely to
happen if retired generals make up half the president’s cabinet—and
what positive outcomes could result if we keep retired generals out of
a president’s inner circle? When we say we do not want retired military
officials to make partisan statements, why not? Similarly, when we
worry about military involvement in domestic politics, or about military
obedience to civilian commands, we would do well to define the harms
with greater specificity.

Conclusion

The notion of civilian control of the military in America today has
come unmoored from its original purpose and arguably is no longer
an effective means to achieve the normative ends we still rightly
value. Instead it is at risk of becoming a rule of aesthetics, not ethics,
and its invocation is at risk of becoming a soothing ritual without
accomplishing anything of value.
Going further, in today’s world a purely formalistic conception of
civilian control of the military carries with it potential dangers. If we
focus on formalistic rules at the expense of substantive normative
ends, we may persuade ourselves that if we can just keep the generals
inside the Pentagon and away from the campaign trail and the White
House, we will have accomplished something meaningful—even as
we blind ourselves to the frightening new forms of power and
coercion that increasingly distort our democracy and destabilize our
world.
Unlike in 1789, both states and nonstate actors have increasingly
found ways to achieve substantial power and control even without the
ability to cause large-scale death and physical destruction. Financial
manipulation, cyberattacks, social media-enabled propaganda, and
disinformation campaigns can demonstrably shift balances of power.
In the future, artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies
will continue to make the use of physical force just one technique
among many.
Humanity continues to wage war the old-fashioned way in many
parts of the globe, with success and failure measured in broken bodies and
terrain lost or gained. But technological changes have both diminished
the ability of states and their organized militaries to monopolize violence
and created numerous nonkinetic means of coercion and control. As a
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result, military power no longer represents the unique potential threat to
American democracy it represented in 1789 (or 1861, 1941, or even 1970).
Should we still worry about the capture of the American state
through non-rights-respecting, nondemocratic means? Certainly. But
today the problem is not solely or fundamentally a civil-military one, if it
ever was. The greatest threats to American democracy stem less from an
out-of-control military than from electoral gerrymandering, information
warfare, and foreign and domestic influence campaigns, complicated by
big data, big money, rising economic inequality, and partisan divisions
distorting our political system.
In an era in which foreign hackers, the superrich, and the purveyors
of fake news can manipulate the American electoral process by sowing
division, mistrust, and violence within the electorate and causing chaos
in the international system, society must find effective ways to prevent
the powerful from distorting or derailing democratic processes. To
focus primarily on the notion the United States is experiencing a civilmilitary crisis, however, risks forgetting our history and ignoring our
present perils.

